Quantifying the security cost of migrating protocols to practice

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_4zbMATH Open1503.94043OpenAlexW3030036765MaRDI QIDQ2096478FDOQ2096478

Authors: Christopher Patton, Thomas Shrimpton 

Publication date: 9 November 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_4

Recommendations

• Forward secrecy of SPAKE2
• Tighter proofs for the SIGMA and TLS 1.3 key exchange protocols
• (De-)constructing TLS 1.3
• On the security of TLS-DHE in the standard model
• On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode

zbMATH Keywords

indifferentiabilityconcrete securityprotocol standardsreal-world cryptography

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• The exact security of digital signatures -- how to sign with RSA and Rabin
• Efficient signature generation by smart cards
• How to build an ideal cipher: the indifferentiability of the Feistel construction
• Careful with composition: limitations of the indifferentiability framework
• Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
• The Security of Triple Encryption and a Framework for Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs
• Merkle-Damgård Revisited: How to Construct a Hash Function
• Theory of Cryptography
• Multi-instance security and its application to password-based cryptography
• Kangaroos, monopoly and discrete logarithms
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange
• The Twin Diffie-Hellman Problem and Applications
• Universally Composable Security with Global Setup
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Message-locked encryption and secure deduplication
• Random oracles with(out) programmability
• The first collision for full SHA-1
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Security of symmetric encryption in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation
• Forward secrecy of SPAKE2
• OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE protocol secure against pre-computation attacks
• Indifferentiable authenticated encryption
• Simplifying game-based definitions -- indistinguishability up to correctness and its application to stateful AE
• Separate your domains: NIST PQC KEMs, oracle cloning and read-only indifferentiability

Cited In (1)

• Forward secrecy of SPAKE2

Uses Software

• NAXOS

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