Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0038OpenAlexW2963692394WikidataQ127444576 ScholiaQ127444576MaRDI QIDQ2099010FDOQ2099010

Authors: Justin Grana, James Bono, David Wolpert 

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0038

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescollusionasynchronicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
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• Folk theorem with communication
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
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• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control of Semi-Markov Jump Processes
• On asynchronously repeated games
• Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information
• Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
• Demand fluctuations in the ready-mix concrete industry

Cited In (2)

• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Independent research and development or technology mergers and acquisitions? Decision mechanisms of research and development strategies in a two-stage game

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