Managerial accountability under yardstick competition

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0037MaRDI QIDQ2099063zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michele G. Giuranno, Marcella Scrimitore, Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0037

zbMATH Keywords

managerial discretionrent seekingTullock context success function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Recommendations

• Yardstick competition and political agency problems
• Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
• Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: the relative performance case
• Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword
• Observable managerial incentives and spatial competition

Cites work

• Asymmetric yardstick competition and municipal cooperation

Cited in

(1)

• Yardstick competition and political agency problems

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