Monetary and macroprudential policy coordination with biased preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2022.104519MaRDI QIDQ2102864zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre-Richard Agénor, Timothy P. Jackson

Publication date 12 December 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104519

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

• Bank capital shocks and countercyclical requirements: implications for banking stability and welfare
• Monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated model with financial intermediation
• Risky bank lending and countercyclical capital buffers
• Should monetary policy lean against the wind? An analysis based on a DSGE model with banking
• The role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks

Cited in

(5)

• Monetary and macroprudential policies under rules and discretion
• Interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies
• Research on the coordination of financial stability and multi-objective of monetary policy -- Based on the data of 2005--2015 years
• Monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated model with financial intermediation
• Preference heterogeneity and optimal monetary policy

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