Monetary and macroprudential policy coordination with biased preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2022.104519OpenAlexW4294191160MaRDI QIDQ2102864FDOQ2102864

Pierre-Richard Agénor, Timothy P. Jackson

Publication date: 12 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104519

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• The role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks
• Monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated model with financial intermediation
• Risky bank lending and countercyclical capital buffers
• Should monetary policy lean against the wind? An analysis based on a DSGE model with banking
• Bank capital shocks and countercyclical requirements: implications for banking stability and welfare

Cited In (2)

• Interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies
• Preference heterogeneity and optimal monetary policy

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