A note on solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games via complementarity

DOI10.1007/s11067-021-09524-xOpenAlexW3159539978MaRDI QIDQ2129561

Francisco Trespalacios, Dimitri J. Papageorgiou, Stuart M. Harwood

Publication date: 22 April 2022

Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.01536

zbMATH Keywords

relaxationcomplementarityequilibriaintegralityNash-Cournot games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical programming (90Cxx) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

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Cites Work

• A large-scale spatial optimization model of the European electricity market
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