Equilibrium customer and socially optimal balking strategies in a constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and N-policy

DOI10.1007/S10878-021-00814-1MaRDI QIDQ2136169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhen Wang, Yiqiang Q. Zhao, Li-Wei Liu

Publication date 10 May 2022

Published in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.00102

zbMATH Keywords

particle swarm optimization algorithmequilibrium strategiesmultiple vacationsbalking strategiesinformation accuracy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming (90C59) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Abstract: In this paper, equilibrium strategies and optimal balking strategies of customers in a constant retrial queue with multiple vacations and the $N$-policy under two information levels, respectively, are investigated. We assume that there is no waiting area in front of the server and an arriving customer is served immediately if the server is idle; otherwise (the server is either busy or on a vacation) it has to leave the system to join a virtual retrial orbit waiting for retrials according to the FCFS rules. After a service completion, if the system is not empty, the server becomes idle, available for serving the next customer, either a new arrival or a retried customer from the virtual retrial orbit; otherwise (if the system is empty), the server starts a vacation. Upon the completion of a vacation, the server is reactivated only if it finds at least $N$ customers in the virtual orbit; otherwise, the server continues another vacation. We study this model at two levels of information, respectively. For each level of information, we obtain both equilibrium and optimal balking strategies of customers, and make corresponding numerical comparisons. Through Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm, we explore the impact of parameters on the equilibrium and social optimal thresholds, and obtain the trend in changes, as a function of system parameters, for the optimal social welfare, which provides guiding significance for social planners. Finally, by comparing the social welfare under two information levels, we find that whether the system information should be disclosed to customers depends on how to maintain the growth of social welfare.

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Cited in

(10)

• Social optimization in \(M/M/1\) queue with working vacation and \(N\)-policy
• Strategic behavior in the constant retrial queue with a single vacation
• Equilibrium strategies in a constant retrial queue with setup time and the \(N\)-policy
• Equilibrium strategies of the constant retrial queue with the \(N\)-policy
• Equilibrium and optimal balking strategies of customers in Markovian queues with multiple vacations and \(N\)-policy
• Joining strategies under two kinds of games for a multiple vacations retrial queue with \(N\)-policy and breakdowns
• On equilibrium in a constant retrial queuing system with reserved time and vacations
• Equilibrium joining strategies in the retrial queue with two classes of customers and delayed vacations
• Equilibrium strategies in a constant retrial queue with an unreliable server and the \(N\)-policy
• Optimal pricing strategy in an unreliable M/M/1 retrial queue with delayed repair and breakdown deterioration

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