Hierarchical games with feedback under the assumption of benevolence of the lower-level player

DOI10.1134/S0005117922030110zbMATH Open1489.91059OpenAlexW4224005034WikidataQ114616272 ScholiaQ114616272MaRDI QIDQ2139503FDOQ2139503

M. A. Gorelov

Publication date: 17 May 2022

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117922030110

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zbMATH Keywords

informationStackelberg equilibriumbenevolencegames with a fixed order of moves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Feedback control (93B52)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Maximal guaranteed result for limited volume of transmitted information
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• Market Structure and Equilibrium
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• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Optimality of the principle of fair play management. Necessary and sufficient conditions for reliability of information in active systems
• The role of information on the opponent's target function in a two-person game with a fixed sequence of moves

Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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