Hierarchical games with feedback under the assumption of benevolence of the lower-level player
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Cites work
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Cited in
(4)- Generalization of Stackelberg equilibrium on the basis of the principle of individual optimum
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- Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, social welfare and optimal structure in hierarchical continuous public goods game
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