Protecting secure ICs against side-channel attacks by identifying and quantifying potential EM and leakage hotspots at simulation stage

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-89915-8_6zbMATH Open1491.94063OpenAlexW3208976711MaRDI QIDQ2145294FDOQ2145294

Authors: D. Poggi, Philippe Maurine, Thomas Ordas, Alexandre Sarafianos 

Publication date: 17 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89915-8_6

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zbMATH Keywords

simulationEM side-channel analysissecure IC design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2004
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Design Flow and Evaluation Framework for DPA-Resistant Instruction Set Extensions

Cited In (2)

• EM attack is non-invasive? - design methodology and validity verification of EM attack sensor
• On-chip evaluation of voltage drops and fault occurrence induced by Si backside EM injection

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