Protecting secure ICs against side-channel attacks by identifying and quantifying potential EM and leakage hotspots at simulation stage
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2145294
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-89915-8_6zbMATH Open1491.94063OpenAlexW3208976711MaRDI QIDQ2145294FDOQ2145294
Thomas Ordas, Philippe Maurine, D. Poggi, Alexandre Sarafianos
Publication date: 17 June 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89915-8_6
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1979273
- Design methodology and validity verification for a reactive countermeasure against EM attacks
- EM attack is non-invasive? - design methodology and validity verification of EM attack sensor
- Localized electromagnetic analysis of cryptographic implementations
- EM Probes Characterisation for Security Analysis
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2004
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Design Flow and Evaluation Framework for DPA-Resistant Instruction Set Extensions
This page was built for publication: Protecting secure ICs against side-channel attacks by identifying and quantifying potential EM and leakage hotspots at simulation stage
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2145294)
