Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the extent of preferential trade agreement formation

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01338-1zbMath1494.91089OpenAlexW3119746130MaRDI QIDQ2150449

Moïse Nken, Halis Murat Yildiz

Publication date: 27 June 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01338-1

zbMATH Keywords

coalition proof Nash equilibriumcustoms unionfree trade agreementexclusion incentivefree riding incentivetariff binding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Free trade: What are the terms-of-trade effects?
• Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements
• Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
• Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach
• Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas

This page was built for publication: Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the extent of preferential trade agreement formation