Attacks on pseudo random number generators hiding a linear structure
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Publication:2152156
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-95312-6_7zbMATH Open1501.94049OpenAlexW4226372749MaRDI QIDQ2152156FDOQ2152156
Authors: Florette Martinez
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95312-6_7
Recommendations
- Cryptanalytic attacks on pseudorandom number generators
- Practical seed-recovery of fast cryptographic pseudo-random number generators
- Inferring sequences produced by pseudo-random number generators
- Predicting truncated multiple recursive generators with unknown parameters
- Inferring sequences produced by nonlinear pseudorandom number generators using Coppersmith's methods
Cites Work
- Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients
- Mean, Median and Mode in Binomial Distributions
- A Strategy for Finding Roots of Multivariate Polynomials with New Applications in Attacking RSA Variants
- Reconstructing Truncated Integer Variables Satisfying Linear Congruences
- Lattice reduction: a toolbox for the cryptoanalyst
- Easing Coppersmith methods using analytic combinatorics: applications to public-key cryptography with weak pseudorandomness
- Cryptanalysis of the knapsack generator
- Subset sum pseudorandom numbers: fast generation and distribution
Cited In (8)
- Cryptanalysis of the knapsack generator
- Fault-injection based backdoors in Pseudo Random Number Generators
- A pseudorandom number generator based on worst-case lattice problems
- Recovering private keys generated with weak PRNGs
- Information Security and Privacy
- Cryptanalytic attacks on pseudorandom number generators
- An improved method for predicting truncated multiple recursive generators with unknown parameters
- Practical seed-recovery of fast cryptographic pseudo-random number generators
Uses Software
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