Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
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- Measurement Theory
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- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
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