Stochastic stability analysis of evolutionary two-player games on regular graphs
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Publication:2164083
Cites work
- Analysis and shifting of stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
- Evolutionary games on the lattice: payoffs affecting birth and death rates
- Evolutionary stability on graphs
- Finite-size effects and switching times for Moran process with mutation
- Hopf bifurcations in two-strategy delayed replicator dynamics
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1243371 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- The logic of animal conflict
- The replicator equation on graphs
- Towards Optimal Control of Evolutionary Games on Networks
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