Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Stable matching in large economies
Cited in
(16)- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity
- Students' social origins and targeted grading
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- College applications and the effect of affirmative action
- Assessing the potential impact of a nationwide class-based affirmative action system
- Selection problems in the presence of implicit bias
- Improving the Chilean college admissions system
- Affirmative Action in Higher Education: How Do Admission and Financial Aid Rules Affect Future Earnings?
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
- Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
- Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
- Meritocracy versus diversity
- Optimal top-n policy
- A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules
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