Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.10.002MaRDI QIDQ2173166zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Christian Trudeau, Juan J. Vidal-Puga

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1705.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

graphsnucleolusShapley valueclique

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(5)

• Cliques and constructors in ``Hats game. II
• On the coincidence property
• A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• One-bound core games
• Minimum cost spanning tree problems as value sharing problems

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