Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.10.002zbMATH Open1437.91040OpenAlexW2752460205WikidataQ126834199 ScholiaQ126834199MaRDI QIDQ2173166FDOQ2173166
Authors: Christian Trudeau, Juan J. Vidal-Puga 
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1705.pdf
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