Feasibility and infeasibility of secure computation with malicious PUFs

DOI10.1007/S00145-019-09329-9zbMath1455.94146OpenAlexW2958290638MaRDI QIDQ2175217

Dominique Schröder, Nils Fleischhacker, Dana Dachman-Soled, Anna Lysyanskaya, Jonathan N. Katz

Publication date: 28 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-019-09329-9

zbMATH Keywords

oblivious transfersecure computationphysically unclonable functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cites Work

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• Unconditional UC-Secure Computation with (Stronger-Malicious) PUFs

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