On rational behavior in a loss system with one observable queue and one unobservable queue

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-27181-7_11MaRDI QIDQ2177552zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Refael Hassin, Jonathan H. P. Milo

Publication date 6 May 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27181-7_11

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsocial optimizationstrategic queueing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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(7)

• Strategic customer behavior in a queueing system with a loss subsystem
• Regulating an observable $M/M/1$ queue
• Rational joining behavior in a queueing system with abandonments
• On equilibrium threshold strategies when choosing between observable and unobservable queues
• Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior
• Asynchronous stochastic approximation and adaptation in a competitive system
• Proofs of conjectures on the competition between observable and unobservable servers

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