Convergence to the mean field game limit: a case study

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Publication:2180385

DOI10.1214/19-AAP1501zbMATH Open1437.91058arXiv1806.00817MaRDI QIDQ2180385FDOQ2180385


Authors: Marcel Nutz, Jaime San Martín, Xiaowei Tan Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 13 May 2020

Published in: The Annals of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of n-player equilibria converges to it as noinfty. However, both the finite and infinite player versions of the game often admit multiple equilibria. We show that mean field equilibria satisfying a transversality condition are limit points of n-player equilibria, but we also exhibit a remarkable class of mean field equilibria that are not limits, thus questioning their interpretation as "large n" equilibria.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.00817




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