How special is democracy? An experimental study of recommendations in the minimum effort game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109066MaRDI QIDQ2180736zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Johanna Mollerstrom, Cass R. Sunstein

Publication date 14 May 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109066

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationdemocracyexperimentinstitutionsvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Cited in

(1)

• Coordinated democracy

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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