Evolutionary game model of stock price synchronicity from investor behavior

DOI10.1155/2020/7957282MaRDI QIDQ2183276zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yue Dong, Jinnan Pan, Tingqiang Chen, Yu-Hao Zhang

Publication date 26 May 2020

Published in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/7957282

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Review text

Summary: Institutional and individual investors are the two important players in the stock market. Together, they determine the price of the stock market. In this paper, an evolutionary game model that contains the two groups of players is proposed to analyze the stock price synchronicity considering the impacts of investors' decisions on stock investment. Factors affecting investors' decisions include the potential revenue or loss, the probability of gain or loss, and the cost of corresponding behavior. The proposed game model is analyzed by replicator dynamics equations and simulation of the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different circumstances. The analysis shows that the operating cost of institutional investors, the cost of information collection before trading, and the expected loss that may be punished by regulators are the key factors that affect the evolutionary game system between institutional investors and individual investors. In addition, reducing the speculation in the market and increasing the information access of investors through the serious operation mode of institutional investors and the strengthening of the market information disclosure mechanism are beneficial to alleviate price synchronicity in stock market.

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