War of attrition with implicit time cost

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.05.016MaRDI QIDQ2186492zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Kristian Lindgren, Torbjörn Lundh, Anders Eriksson

Publication date 9 June 2020

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0406005

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stable strategywaiting gamewar of attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Abstract: In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the strategies of the whole population. We identify and analyse the underlying mechanisms responsible for the implicit time cost. Each player participates in a series of games, where those prepared to wait longer win with higher certainty but play less frequently. The model is characterised by the ratio of the winner's score to the loser's score, in a single game. The fitness of a player is determined by the accumulated score from the games played during a generation. We derive the stationary distribution of strategies under the replicator dynamics. When the score ratio is high, we find that the stationary distribution is unstable, with respect to both evolutionary and dynamical stability, and the dynamics converge to a limit cycle. When the ratio is low, the dynamics converge to the stationary distribution. For an intermediate interval of the ratio, the distribution is dynamically but not evolutionarily stable. Finally, the implications of our results for previous models based on the war of attrition are discussed.

Recommendations

• The finite horizon war of attrition
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Cites work

• Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3863589 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3241743 (Why is no real title available?)
• The allocation of resources in a multiple-trial war of attrition conflict
• The finite horizon war of attrition
• The logic of animal conflict
• The n-person war of attrition

Cited in

(7)

• A large population parental care game: polymorphisms and feedback between patterns of care and the operational sex ratio
• The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints
• The finite horizon war of attrition
• Coevolution of the reckless prey and the patient predator
• The \(N\)-player war of attrition in the limit of infinitely many players
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• The allocation of resources in a multiple-trial war of attrition conflict

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