Cocktails done right: price competition and welfare when substitutes become complements

DOI10.1007/S00712-020-00690-ZMaRDI QIDQ2195259zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matteo Alvisi, Emanuela Carbonara

Publication date 8 September 2020

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00690-z

zbMATH Keywords

complementsexcessive pricingpharmaceutical marketsprice discounts and premiaprice discriminationvertical differentiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• A more general theory of commodity bundling
• Bundling as an Entry Barrier
• Quality and Quantity Competition
• Separating complements: the effects of competition and quality leadership

Cited in

(1)

• Understanding the price effects of the MillerCoors joint venture

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