Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits

DOI10.1007/S10479-018-2826-YMaRDI QIDQ2196104zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jiasen Sun, Guo Li

Publication date 28 August 2020

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2826-y

zbMATH Keywords

double auctioncap-and-trade systememission permit tradingre-allocation of emission permits (RAEP)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Agent competition double-auction mechanism
• Can double auctions control monopoly and monopsony power in emissions trading markets?
• Centralised reallocation of emission permits using DEA
• EU emissions trading scheme, competitiveness and carbon leakage: new evidence from cement and steel industries
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
• Measuring the efficiency of decision making units
• The implication of time-based payment contract in the decentralized assembly system
• Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
• Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
• An auction-bargaining model for initial emission permits
• Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances to supply chains via multi-agent-based model and Q-learning
• Optimizing emission reduction task sharing: technology and performance perspectives
• Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation
• Centralised reallocation of emission permits using DEA
• Divisible goods auction model and a method for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity
• Allocation of emission permits based on DEA and production stability
• A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights

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