Notes on a provably-secure certificate-based encryption against malicious CA attacks
DOI10.1016/J.INS.2018.06.049zbMATH Open1441.94096OpenAlexW2809598809WikidataQ121302493 ScholiaQ121302493MaRDI QIDQ2198258FDOQ2198258
Authors: Wenjie Yang, Jian Weng, Anjia Yang, Congge Xie, Yaxi Yang 
Publication date: 9 September 2020
Published in: Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2018.06.049
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Cites Work
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- A provably secure certificate-based encryption scheme against malicious CA attacks in the standard model
- Continuous leakage-resilient certificate-based encryption
- Verifiable Computation over Large Database with Incremental Updates
- Insight of the protection for data security under selective opening attacks
- Identity-based chameleon hashing and signatures without key exposure
- Identity-Based Encryption with Outsourced Revocation in Cloud Computing
- Efficient Certificate-Based Encryption in the Standard Model
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