When should signals of submission be given? -- A game theory model

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2005.10.002MaRDI QIDQ2202144zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Shuichi Matsumura, Thomas J. Hayden

Publication date 17 September 2020

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

contestdisplayincomplete informationresource holding potentialsubmission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50)

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Cites work

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• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(1)

• Resource holding potential, subjective resource value, and game theoretical models of aggressiveness signalling

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