On the security of NTS-KEM in the quantum random oracle model

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-54074-6_1zbMATH1459.94131OpenAlexW3013457707MaRDI QIDQ2221099FDOQ2221099

Authors Varun Maram

Publication date 26 January 2021

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/424557

zbMATH Keywords

IND-CCA securityquantum random oracle modelKEMcode-basedNIST standardization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum computation (81P68) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

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(4)

• Separate your domains: NIST PQC KEMs, oracle cloning and read-only indifferentiability
• Tightly-secure key-encapsulation mechanism in the quantum random oracle model
• An efficient post-quantum KEM from CSIDH
• Anonymity of NIST PQC round 3 KEMs

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