Producer's choice of design-for-environment under environmental taxation
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Publication:2242252
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.048zbMath1487.90081OpenAlexW3159047793MaRDI QIDQ2242252
Tsan-Ming Choi, Lipan Feng, Ya-Jun Cai, Yongjian Li
Publication date: 9 November 2021
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.04.048
Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (4)
Roles of reciprocity and fairness concerns in airline-airport systems with environmental considerations ⋮ Manufacturers' product-line strategies under various government regulations ⋮ Disposable or reusable? Packaging strategy and pricing decision for fresh food considering environmental policies ⋮ Reselling or marketplace mode for an online platform: the choice between cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulation
Cites Work
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