The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01268-wzbMath1475.91279OpenAlexW3034356417MaRDI QIDQ2244407

Jan Sauermann

Publication date: 12 November 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01268-w

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Sophisticated voting under the sequential Voting by Veto
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power

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