Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2012.09.032zbMATH Open1292.91037OpenAlexW2055667853MaRDI QIDQ2253545FDOQ2253545
Authors: Günter Fandel, Jan Trockel 
Publication date: 27 July 2014
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.032
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Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Group preferences (91B10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Decision theory for games (91A35)
Cited In (9)
- On the performance of managers and controllers: a polymatrix game approach for the manager-controller-board of directors' conflict
- Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
- Applying a one-shot and infinite repeated inspection game to materials management
- Pareto-efficient strategies in 3-person games played with staircase-function strategies
- On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games
- Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection
- Fire code inspection and compliance: a game-theoretic model between fire inspection agencies and building owners
- Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
- Distributing inspections in space and time -- proposed solution of a difficult problem
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