Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2012.09.032MaRDI QIDQ2253545zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Günter Fandel, Jan Trockel

Publication date 27 July 2014

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.032

zbMATH Keywords

decision theorygroup decision makinginspection game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Group preferences (91B10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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Cited in

(9)

• On the performance of managers and controllers: a polymatrix game approach for the manager-controller-board of directors' conflict
• Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
• Applying a one-shot and infinite repeated inspection game to materials management
• Pareto-efficient strategies in 3-person games played with staircase-function strategies
• On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games
• Cheating in a contest with strategic inspection
• Fire code inspection and compliance: a game-theoretic model between fire inspection agencies and building owners
• Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
• Distributing inspections in space and time -- proposed solution of a difficult problem

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