Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis

DOI10.1016/J.JCSS.2014.11.003MaRDI QIDQ2256718zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gábor Erdélyi, Michael R. Fellows, Jörg Rothe, Lena Schend

Publication date 20 February 2015

Published in Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2014.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

Bucklin votingcomputational social choicecontrol complexityelection systemsexperimental analysisfallback voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Experimental studies (91A90) Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

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• A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
• Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
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• Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
• Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
• Frequency of correctness versus average polynomial time
• Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
• How hard is it to control an election?
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 67483 (Why is no real title available?)
• Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
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• Search versus decision for election manipulation problems
• Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(13)

• Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
• A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
• Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
• Controlling sub-tournaments: easy or hard problem? Theoretical vs. practical analysis
• Tennis manipulation: can we help Serena Williams win another tournament? Or can we control a knockout tournament with reasonable complexity?
• Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
• Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
• Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
• The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
• Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
• The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
• On the complexity of destructive bribery in approval-based multiwinner voting
• Drawing a map of elections

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