Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
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Publication:2267527
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.005zbMath1200.91196MaRDI QIDQ2267527
Publication date: 1 March 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.005
91A12: Cooperative games
91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
91B55: Economic dynamics
Related Items
Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf, Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade, The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?, Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
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