The instability of instability of centered distributions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2270335
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.09.003zbMath1200.91092MaRDI QIDQ2270335
Publication date: 18 March 2010
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.09.003
91B70: Stochastic models in economics
91B12: Voting theory
91B10: Group preferences
91B14: Social choice
91B72: Spatial models in economics
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