A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126031 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A limit theorem on the minmax set
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Computerizing politics
- Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Convergence of stochastic processes
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
- On 64%-Majority Rule
- Partitions of mass-distributions and of convex bodies by hyperplanes
- Points of increase for random walks
- Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
- Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- The almost surely shrinking yolk
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
- The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
- The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
- Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces
Cited in
(8)- The finagle point is close to the yolk
- \textit{In Silico} voting experiments
- Generalized medians and a political center
- The almost surely shrinking yolk
- Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger
- Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
- Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
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