A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
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Publication:2270337
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.09.005zbMath1200.91094OpenAlexW2044042625MaRDI QIDQ2270337
Publication date: 18 March 2010
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.09.005
Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Probability distributions: general theory (60E05) Voting theory (91B12)
Related Items (7)
Generalized medians and a political center ⋮ Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger ⋮ Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed ⋮ The instability of instability of centered distributions ⋮ The almost surely shrinking yolk ⋮ Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk ⋮ In Silico Voting Experiments
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