Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.03.031zbMATH Open1218.91113OpenAlexW2024606470MaRDI QIDQ2275657FDOQ2275657

Authors: Timo Henckel, Gordon Douglas Menzies, Nick Prokhovnik, Daniel John Zizzo 

Publication date: 9 August 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.031

zbMATH Keywords

reputationtime inconsistencycredibilityinferential expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited In (1)

• Conflicting evidence and decisions by agency professionals: an experimental test in the context of Merger regulation

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