Abstract: Suppose there are Markov chains and we need to pay a per-step emph{price} to advance them. The "destination" states of the Markov chains contain rewards; however, we can only get rewards for a subset of them that satisfy a combinatorial constraint, e.g., at most of them, or they are acyclic in an underlying graph. What strategy should we choose to advance the Markov chains if our goal is to maximize the total reward emph{minus} the total price that we pay? In this paper we introduce a Markovian price of information model to capture settings such as the above, where the input parameters of a combinatorial optimization problem are given via Markov chains. We design optimal/approximation algorithms that jointly optimize the value of the combinatorial problem and the total paid price. We also study emph{robustness} of our algorithms to the distribution parameters and how to handle the emph{commitment} constraint. Our work brings together two classical lines of investigation: getting optimal strategies for Markovian multi-armed bandits, and getting exact and approximation algorithms for discrete optimization problems using combinatorial as well as linear-programming relaxation ideas.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7378727 (Why is no real title available?)
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