Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.013zbMath1476.91074OpenAlexW2924347265MaRDI QIDQ2294306

Baris Vardar, Georges Zaccour

Publication date: 10 February 2020

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.013

zbMATH Keywords

fair allocationcoupled constraintsnormalized equilibriumfirst-best solutionexchange of bads

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Existence of projected solutions for generalized Nash equilibrium problems

Cites Work

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• A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads
• Core convergence in economies with bads
• Existence of Equilibria in Economies with Bads
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• Generalized Nash equilibrium problems

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