Allocating common costs of multinational companies based on arm's length principle and Nash non-cooperative game
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.049zbMath1441.91034OpenAlexW2991506542WikidataQ126647932 ScholiaQ126647932MaRDI QIDQ2294639
Linda Zhang, Lin Lin, Qianzhi Dai, Yong-Jun Li
Publication date: 11 February 2020
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.049
Nash equilibriumdata envelopment analysisarm's length principlecommon cost allocationNash noncooperative game
Noncooperative games (91A10) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (3)
Cites Work
- Measuring the efficiency of decision making units
- Allocating fixed costs and common revenue via data envelopment analysis
- The fair allocation of common fixed cost or revenue using DEA concept
- Allocating fixed costs and target setting: DEA-based approach
- Allocating the fixed cost as a complement of other cost inputs: A DEA approach
- Centralized fixed cost and resource allocation considering technology heterogeneity: a DEA approach
- A new data envelopment analysis based approach for fixed cost allocation
- Allocating the fixed cost: an approach based on data envelopment analysis and cooperative game
- Characterizing an equitable allocation of shared costs: A DEA approach
- An alternative approach for equitable allocation of shared costs by using DEA
- Allocating fixed costs and resources via data envelopment analysis
- Fixed cost and resource allocation based on DEA cross-efficiency
- Allocation of shared costs among decision making units: a DEA approach
- Proportional sharing and DEA in allocating the fixed cost
- A new approach for allocating fixed costs among decision making units
- Programming with linear fractional functionals
This page was built for publication: Allocating common costs of multinational companies based on arm's length principle and Nash non-cooperative game