On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
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Cites work
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
- On cores and indivisibility
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Voting by Committees
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(11)- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
- On the implementation of the median
- Menu mechanisms
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Group obvious strategy-proofness: definition and characterization
- On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
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