Recommendations
Cites work
- A counterexample to Dhillon (1998)
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3039539 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impartiality: Definition and Representation
- No-betting-Pareto dominance
- Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
- Relative Utilitarianism
- State dependent expected utility for Savage's state space
- The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
- Utilitarianism without individual utilities
Cited in
(12)- Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences
- Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism
- Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
- On weighted utilitarianism and an application
- Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
- Commitment and anticipated utilitarianism
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Bayesian social aggregation with non-Archimedean utilities and probabilities
- Two time-consistent Paretian solutions to the intertemporal resource allocation problem
- Do performances of violin virtuosi fade over time? A response using the Nash collective utility function
- Social choice rules when individuals are responsible for their skills
- Bayesian utilitarianism and probability homogeneity
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