Coordination of time-varying price supply chain with inequity-averse retailers
Summary: In order to coordinate time-varying price supply chain with inequity-averse retailers, this paper proposes a cooperative system decision model based on buy-back contract. The model concentratedly takes the market demand, manufacturers' order response time, retailers' inequity aversion, and time-varying price into consideration. Through sensitivity analysis of model parameters, the influence of inequity aversion characteristics of retailers on contract parameters is analyzed by a numerical example. The result reveals that the cooperative system based on buy-back contract can coordinate such supply chains. And it shows that when the retailer has disadvantageous inequity aversion, the buy-back contract is beneficial to the manufacturer; when the retailer has advantageous inequity aversion, the buy-back contract is beneficial to the retailer.
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