Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.10.004MaRDI QIDQ2304201zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Srinivas Arigapudi

Publication date 6 March 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

bilingual gamesevolutionary game theorylogit choicestochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Large deviations (60F10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games
• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• Hamilton-Jacobi equations with semilinear costs and state constraints, with applications to large deviations in games
• How noise matters.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Log-linear dynamics and local potential
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
• Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
• Revisiting log-linear learning: asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The logit-response dynamics
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction

Cited in

(12)

• Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism
• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
• Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
• Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19104 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054806 (Why is no real title available?)
• Hamilton-Jacobi equations with semilinear costs and state constraints, with applications to large deviations in games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7689526 (Why is no real title available?)
• Unstable diffusion in social networks
• Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
• Evolutionary dynamics in bilingual games

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