Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.04.015zbMath1418.91266OpenAlexW2943718698WikidataQ127964893 ScholiaQ127964893MaRDI QIDQ2311131

Sjaak Hurkens, Matthew Ellman

Publication date: 10 July 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/180923

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardmechanism designprivate informationcrowdfunding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (1)

Optimal crowdfunding design

Cites Work

• Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
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