On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities

DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1124-xzbMath1422.91140OpenAlexW3125947295MaRDI QIDQ2323605

Shuo Liu, Alexey Kushnir

Publication date: 3 September 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designdominant strategy implementationBayesian implementationincreasing differences over distributionsnonlinear utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Public goods (91B18)

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