The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09702-XMaRDI QIDQ2329153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors James Nguyen

Publication date 17 October 2019

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09702-x

zbMATH Keywords

Arrowfixed preferencesrestricted domainssocial choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
• Arrow's theorem and theory choice
• Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
• Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems
• Domain conditions in social choice theory
• Evaluating competing theories via a common language of qualitative verdicts
• How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or LessAd HocTheories will Provide More Accurate Predictions
• Objectivity, ambiguity, and theory choice
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem

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