Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.05.002MaRDI QIDQ2334823zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Lan Sun

Publication date 8 November 2019

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

hypothesis testing equilibriumsignalling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
• Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

Cites work

• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited in

(3)

• Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy
• Hypothesis Testing Under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Signaling Game
• Conditional hypothesis testing systems

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