A non-inferentialist, anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity
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Publication:2339010
DOI10.1007/s11245-011-9111-xzbMath1308.03033MaRDI QIDQ2339010
Publication date: 27 March 2015
Published in: Topoi (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-011-9111-x
03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
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