Stochastic bequest games
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Publication:2343400
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.017zbMath1318.91026OpenAlexW2162752438MaRDI QIDQ2343400
Anna Jaśkiewicz, Łukasz Balbus, Andrzej S. Nowak
Publication date: 5 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.017
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