The insider-outsider model reexamined
Summary: In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation [\textit{A. Galeotti} et al., Games Econ. Behav. 54, No. 2, 353--372 (2006; Zbl 1125.91006)]. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and we examine the architectures of strict Nash networks. We show that centrality and small diameter are robust features of strict Nash networks. Then, we study the Nash and efficient networks when the decay vanishes.
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