Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.003zbMath1311.91155OpenAlexW2087816839MaRDI QIDQ2345222

Dov Samet, Ron Holzman

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

corestable matchingassortative matchingmarriage problemcorrelated preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem ⋮ Match making in complex social networks ⋮ Social integration in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets ⋮ Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core ⋮ Preference aggregation for couples

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem

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