An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
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Publication:2347773
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.002zbMath1318.91043MaRDI QIDQ2347773
Wooyoung Lim, Ernest K. Lai, Joseph Tao-yi Wang
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.002
laboratory experiment; strategic information transmission; robust equilibrium; fully revealing equilibrium; multidimensional cheap talk
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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