The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
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Publication:2353262
DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9415-6zbMath1377.91021MaRDI QIDQ2353262
Publication date: 9 July 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00846826v2/file/scea-revision.pdf
91A12: Cooperative games
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